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Abstract: During the Tokugawa bakufu, Japan’s foreign policy was under set
conditions, generally known as sakoku, meaning ‘closed country’. However, the
existing regime was not fully closed to the outside world. Contact with foreigners
in Nagasaki, Tsushima, and Ryūkyū Islands meant that the country was not
completely isolated, but rather experienced a situation in which government
policy was aimed at achieving strict control over all contact with the outside
world, as part of a larger strategy to monopolize all foreign relations. This paper
examines the ideas of Takashima Shirōtayu Shūhan (1798–1866), one of the
early Japanese reformers, who argued for the modernization of Japan. Beginning
in the 1830s, a Nagasaki bakufu official, Takashima Shūhan, began importing
flintlock pistols, known as gewehr rifles, from the Netherlands. Additionally,
through the Dutch at Dejima, Takashima managed to obtain cannons, field
guns, and mortars, in doing so highlighting the importance of the modernization
of the artillery forces of the bakufu army. In September 1840, Takashima Shūhan
completed his memorandum, which was sent to the bakufu top administers. On
27 June 1841, Takashima was permitted to undertake the first modern Western
military demonstration in Tokumarugahara (an area north of the capital city,
Edo). He was heavily criticized by many, including bugyō Torii Tadateru,1 and
was placed under investigation and house arrest on charges of subversion and
conspiracy. Takashima’s memorandum requires careful study in order to dis-
cover the reasons for the bakufu’s response, which must also include a discus-
sion of the Japanese financial situation at that time.
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people who had a strong interest in Western culture and military arts.
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1 Introduction
Despite appeals to the samurai spirit, the Meiji Restoration was accompanied by
war that employed modern arms. Little evidence of the use of pikes and archery
demonstrates that this war employed rifles and cannons, despite the fact that a
samurai contingent fought on both sides. Swords were not as popular as rifles;
additionally, mentions of arquebuses and other older firearms are as rare as
those of pikes and archery. How did the Japanese manage to change weapons so
radically and quickly? The impact of the Opium War was a significant factor and
cannot be underestimated. The Japanese were fully aware of the overwhelming
defeat of the Chinese at the hands of British troops. As such, some answers can
be found by reviewing the Memorandum of Takashima Shūhan,2 which was
linked to the Opium War.
The importance of this document is not limited to military matters.
Takashima’s Memorandum allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the
nature of many of the principals of foreign relations that guided the leaders
of the bakufu in its foreign policy. During the time of the Tokugawa bakufu,
Japanese government officials closely monitored the situation outside their
country, and received new information from both Chinese and Dutch
sources.
For most of its existence, the Tokugawa bakufu maintained a foreign policy
stance that was underscored by the term sakoku.3 This term, however, was
borrowed from European studies of Japan, and may not fully reflect all the
features of the existing principles of foreign policy conduct. As such, a more
thorough investigation of Japanese foreign policy in the first half of the 19th
2 Takashima Shūhan 高島秋帆 (1798–1866), machi toshiyori 町年寄 (district head) of the
Nagasaki Administration, hereditary samurai of Shogun and the third son of Takashima
Shirōbei, in addition to being the master of the Takashima-ryū (the Takashima modern military
school), who made a significant contribution to the spread of modern military knowledge and
the production of modern arms (Jaundrill 2016). In 1840, he presented a memorandum and was
permitted to conduct a demonstration in Tokumarugahara. In 1842, he was suddenly placed
under arrest and lost his post in the Nagasaki Administration. In 1853, he was restored to his
position and served as an adviser to the Nagasaki Administration and as a teacher in the
military school created by the bakufu.
3 鎖国.
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century is required, which may provide a rich source of material from which to
draw in order to better understand some of the basic principles of Japan’s
relations with the outside world.
The sakoku regime is widely discussed in the research literature because,
as Marius Jansen4 states, “Japan itself was far from fully ‘closed’”.
Understanding sakoku only as ‘isolation’, however, does not represent the
entire complexity of the situation. According to Ronald Toby, “continued
intercourse with the West (…) would have meant that Japan maintained
complete access to the most advanced scientific, industrial, and strategic
developments in Europe, and [may] even have fostered an enduring
Japanese scientific and industrial revolution”.5 The key element of Toby’s
approach is that “the bakufu, as a central authority, held firm control over
foreign trade and diplomacy.”6
The name ‘Takashima Shūhan’ is often-mentioned in Western research.
Marius Jansen devotes roughly two pages to outlining Takashima’s achieve-
ments and subsequent fate, concluding that “it was difficult for those who
saw their whole identity threatened by the adoption of Western methods to
reconcile themselves to such changes”.7 Hence, Jansen focuses on political
and ideological factors. This part of Jansen’s book includes no references;
however, we can assume that he primarily used the work of Arima Seiho,8 a
well-known Japanese scholar, both in and outside of Japan, who published a
short article in English in 1964 that can be used to represent his methods for
evaluating Takashima Shūhan.9 The results of Seiho’s studies are essential for
an adequate understanding of Takashima’s activities; admittedly, however, his
research falls short of the required in-depth knowledge needed for the present
study.
The Memorandum of Takashima Shūhan, which has never been translated
into English, allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of many of
the principles of foreign relations that guided the leaders of the bakufu in
establishing foreign policy. Furthermore, it also contributes information regard-
ing the motives of the Order of 1842, which changed the priorities of the bakufu’s
foreign policy.
4 Jansen 2000: 92.
5 Toby 1984: xiv.
6 Hellyer 2009: 7.
7 Jansen 2000: 288.
8 Arima 1958, 1964.
9 Arima 1964.
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2 Translation of the Memorandum of Takashima
Shūhan (September 1840)10
In the Year of the Mouse,11 a Dutch ship arriving at the port of Nagasaki brought
a message that the British in Canton had caused a significant military distur-
bance. The same information was also relayed by Captain Xu Aytey, who heard
about it prior to leaving China. For people of my low station (“dark and
ignorant”), it is inexcusable to attract the attention of respected people without
good reason. However, I cannot stop thinking about it. Even if what I believe
does not meet with approval, it may be received positively by some. In the
following, I present my humble thoughts.
Westerners and other barbarians use gunpowder weapons and warships as
primary tools of warfare and employ gunnery as a primary means of defending
their countries, having actively mastered the techniques of their use. In recent
years, however, weapons have changed, and they have been tested in real
combat conditions in a series of wars. Artillery technology, in particular, has
changed dramatically. Compared to China, England is a much smaller territory;
its military achievements may therefore, at times, appear difficult to understand,
and the reasons for its victories not always immediately clear. In spite of this,
China suffered significant defeats against England. I believe this to be the result
of the weapons employed by British armies. China’s defense strategies were well
planned and certainly provided protection; however, the British fought without
any difficulties, sometimes even playfully, using warships right from the start.
Moreover, the Dutch openly state that the Chinese artillery led to children’s
taunts, which also occurred for the above reasons.
In the Imperial country, since ancient times, a divine martial art has been
applied to fight various barbarians. During the Tenbun years, muskets began
being used; following this, and up to the present, there has existed a need for
gunpowder, the use of which I sincerely think is the right way. However, the
shooting techniques in current artillery houses remains the same as those used
in the West many centuries ago. Despite this, each house has its own school and
carefully guards its techniques from others. In addition, many people only focus
on external beauty and compete on this for fun. The government pays constant
attention to the defense of the country, and deals with the artillery houses
without recourse, regardless of the debate about benefits and drawbacks, and
despite the fact that the public is still far from taking part in a discussion about
10 Translation based on Takashima 1974: 6–9.
11 1840.
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the development of artillery. If, on the contrary, this situation is known by the
barbarians, the current state of defense may become inadequate. Various south-
ern barbarians, including the soldiers of the defeated troops, will attack the
vastness of the surrounding seas in war because they are more akin to thieves,
who are not afraid of death and will do things that can cause resentment. In our
land, it is possible that they can, through force, require supplies and water. It is
not the case that we need to become dirty through revenge using our military
art. In addition, artillery has not yet gained the necessary maturity, and there-
fore, in my opinion, this creates a situation where we have no choice.
In particular, it is of importance to Nagasaki, which is a place of commerce
with foreign states; this being the case, we should fear to the maximum extent
the possibility of emergencies, and we should be especially careful to prepare for
them. My older colleagues and I were given orders about the study of artillery,
and this is quite important in order to calm all men without rank who must give
thanks a thousand times. In order to even slightly justify higher blessings and
absolutely pure motives, I began to study artillery in the House of Ogino and
others, but I could not find any satisfactory conditions there. To protect our-
selves from barbarians, as I understand it, artillery is extremely important, and
so I studied the various houses to cover this issue, especially the grounds and
principles of gunnery, thinking about what would happen on the field in the
case of real military action. I realized that the Dutch do indeed have grounds for
laughing at the conditions of the artillery in our country. The techniques used by
our houses and rounds of ammunition, including various secret methods, can-
not even get close to the capabilities of bombs (explosive shells). I would kindly
like to draw your attention to other spheres pertaining to the same situation. I
am not going to say that the technique of houses is not polished, but their
equipment is in the condition in which it came when it arrived from abroad
many years ago, and unsuccessful shots and serious wounds are very possible,
which is very dangerous. People of high rank do not want to practice shooting,
and their arguments are easy to understand. Gunnery has become the activity of
the poor samurai, but they cannot become the wings of the Imperial military
system, something that I must admit with a heavy sigh.
Artillery is of paramount importance to the defense of the country. Let me
say that the noble houses and all the other houses, up to the present time, have
been engaged in the use of gunpowder, and we need to discard all arguments
about advantages and disadvantages and radically turn the gunpowder case in
our country under Heaven. If these houses turn to the real issues of defense,
then the military power of our country will shine even more and, I think, the
reign in our country will be long. I humbly ask you to consider accepting the
mortars and other artillery techniques invented in recent times and consider the
The Memorandum of Takashima Shūhan 253
possibility of placing them on the external borders of Edo. In addition, there are
general considerations regarding the equipping of the coast and the outer
borders of Nagasaki presented by the Houses of Kuroda and Nabeshima. To
provide comment from my modest thinking would be unforgivable audacity,
thus I will refrain from commenting. I will humbly permit myself to say that, if
my reasoning be accepted, it would result in great happiness for me.
In addition, in the case of an emergency, people from 5 kumi12 would
need to be in their places and be allocated only 3 to 4 men. This is very
small. May I ask that this point is paid special attention to? Among the local
officials are many who get considerable subsidiaries, and they can receive
training on the normal days to engage in military affairs, so that, in case of
emergency, they could help the bugyōsho.13 I humbly request that this pro-
posal be considered.
I have humbly expressed many extraordinary thoughts above, perhaps for
which it is difficult to avoid punishment for disrespect, but I humbly say that,
throughout the year, I constantly think about what is happening in Canton, and
even if I receive a reprimand, it will still be happiness for me.
3 Nagasaki and sakoku
In the Edo period, Nagasaki, Tsushima, and the Ryūkyū Islands were places of
permanent contact with representatives of other states and nations. In his
Memorandum, Takashima discusses, in particular, the importance of Nagasaki:
“a place of commerce with foreign states; this being the case, we should fear to
the maximum extent the possibility of emergencies, and we should be especially
careful to prepare for them”.14 The use of the verb ‘to prepare’ means, first of all,
in a military direction.
Takashima Shūhan served as an official in Nagasaki and had a thorough
knowledge of European weapons and tactics, but he was not the first person in
the Takashima family who had an interest in foreign weapons and military
training. At first, he learned from his father, Takashima Shirōbei, who also
had an official post in the Nagasaki administration, and he also gained signifi-
cant knowledge of European warfare during his stay in office because he
supervised part of the coastal defense.
12 Koshō kumi, Shoinban kumi, Shinban kumi, Ōban kumi, and Kojūnin kumi.
13 奉行所, the office of the local administration at Nagasaki.
14 Takashima 1974: 6.
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Takashima had acquired, from 1823 to 1827, military information from the
Chief of the Dutch factory, Jon Willem de Sturler, who was the Reserve Colonel
of the Dutch army and had experience of the Napoleonic Wars, thus giving him
extensive knowledge about armies, weapons, the military industry, and ballistic
calculations.15 On the basis of Sturler’s knowledge, Takashima was able to order
not only simple books with sketches of European armies and maps, but also
books that provided a more exhaustive description of artillery bombshells and
grenades, army strategy and tactics, and the manufacturing of weapons.
Takashima’s official post was based in Nagasaki, and this allowed him to
obtain books and samples of weapons, that provided extensive opportunities to
energetically study European weapons and tactics. He writes: “My older collea-
gues and I were given orders about the study of artillery, and (...) must give a
thousand times thanks”.16 Placing orders almost every year, he amassed a
collection of manuscripts that contained more than one hundred volumes. In
particular, he was interested in artillery, fortification, and coastal defense. This
also led to a strong interest in European natural sciences. Furthermore,
Takashima ordered several books about molding technology and the manufac-
turing of weapons and gunpowder from Holland.
Concerning the role of Nagasaki trade, it also seems important to draw
attention to the fact that trade was based on transactions through orders and
barter. Free trade was very difficult to control, and therefore, in Nagasaki, it was
not possible to find a free market or a free flow of commodities, nor was it
possible to get easy access to foreign merchants with a free circulation of foreign
cash. Takashima bought items in Japan by order from the Dutch factories, and his
orders brought him various items from Europe. Some items, including books and
watches, were legally sold in Japan by Takashima, which could then pay for the
Dutch orders. This was the usual way of conducting transactions, with foreigners
and several officials from Nagasaki and Edo having access to this trade.
Takashima also placed orders for weapons on behalf of some other bakufu
officials and various private lords from Kyushu and other regions. For instance,
in 1836, Takashima placed an order for 80 rifles. According to the calculation of
Arima Seiho,17 Takashima imported a total of 125 infantry rifles in the 1830s.
Several Nagasaki officials made orders for rifles and ammunition, including
other machi toshiyori Hisamatsu Sekijiro18 and Fukuda Yasuemon.19
15 Arima 1964: 352–379.
16 Takashima 1974: 7.
17 Arima 1958.
18 The elder brother of Takashima Shūhan.
19 Ishida 2009: 303.
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In 1835, Takashima made orders for gewehrs (flintlock rifles) and two yager
rifles, several pistols, 16-pound mortars, 16-pound howitzers, and two three-
pound field guns. In addition, he imported empty bombshells and grenades,
ammunition belts, long glasses, more than a thousand flints, and many other
items. Furthermore, in 1834 and 1835, he placed orders for casting molds for the
production of grenades, as well as 16-pound howitzers, three-pound field guns,
tartaric acid, and other items necessary for weapon production in Japan.20
His set of ideas regarding military training was called Takashima-ryū (the
Takashima modern military school), and it substantially enlarged the number of
people who understood the real gap between modern Western firearms and
Japanese swords and arquebuses. Thus, the emergence of Takashima-ryū was
a remarkable event for a country where contemporary military schools strongly
stressed the use of old artillery.
4 East Asia in the first half of the nineteenth
century
It is also essential that we keep inmind the worsening relations between Britain and
China at this time. In 1839, Dutch merchants brought news of the exacerbation of
the conflict between Britain and China over the opium trade and the appointment of
Commissioner Lin Zexu. Later, other messages delivered by Chinese merchants
brought information about an increase in tensions between the two countries and
the beginning of armed conflict. Various people throughout Japan paid a great deal
of attention to the situation in their neighboring country, as evidenced by the
speculation that, as China was too big to attract the attention of England and
Korea was too small, the next possible target of British policy could well be Japan.
Takashima wrote that, in 1840, a Dutch ship, which arrived at the port of
Nagasaki, brought a message that the British in Canton had stirred up quite a
disturbance. The same information was also relayed by Captain Xu Aytey, who
had heard about it before leaving China. This report about British activities in
Canton was actually the beginning of the Opium War.21
In May 1839, the Chinese Commissioner in Canton, Lin Zexu, demanded
that the foreign traders turn over their opium. The following month, an enor-
mous quantity of opium was destroyed, which took more than three weeks.
20 Arima 1958: 68–70.
21 Takashima 1974: 6.
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Growing tensions between China and Britain finally lead to the first Opium War
(1840–1842).
In the tense atmosphere of 24 June 1839, the captain of an ordinary Dutch
ship delivered the news about the conflict between Britain and China. These
words were translated into Japanese, but in language which was very favorable
to the Chinese and which included news about great trouble for the Europeans:
The illegal opium trade in Guangzhou was prohibited, and for that reason a high-ranking
official from the capital was sent there. In addition, a strong order was issued not to hide
stored opium, but to surrender it to Chinese authorities. This caused great trouble for the
Europeans who had stored the opium. Furthermore, in the territory of China, if somebody
heard about people who took opium, then he must punish that person regardless of his
position. Furthermore, people who violate this order must be severely punished.22
Nevertheless, it was apparent that growing tensions could easily lead to open
hostilities, and, in June 1840, news was delivered of the beginning of the first
Opium War.
Ultimately, China’s military losses in the war forced its rulers to sign treaties
opening several new ports to foreign trade. The restrictions imposed under the
Canton system were also abolished. Despite imperial prohibitions, the main
reason for the war was the opium that had been traded, and a stunned
Takashima wrote that the “British are fighting without any difficulty, and some-
times playfully”,23 arguing that the British victory was being achieved by the use
of modern weaponry and tactics.
Casualties for the Chinese army were more than one hundred times greater
than those suffered by the British forces. According to a report submitted to the
British government in 1847, total combat casualties in the first Opium War were
sixty-nine killed and 451 wounded, while Chinese casualties were estimated at
about 18,000 to 20,000.24
All news about China came through Nagasaki, which was under full control
of the bakufu officials. Takashima Shūhan, as one of the administrative officials,
therefore had a great opportunity to deliver important information to the bakufu
about modern achievements in the development of warfare and weaponry in
Europe, and about the degree of backwardness of Japan, in order to increase the
influence of modern weaponry and methods of warfare in Nagasaki.
England had become widely known in Japan since the “Phaeton incident”
(Phaeton jiken), which related to the intrusion of the frigate Phaeton into the port
22 Mori 2001: 4.
23 Takashima 1974: 6
24 Purdue 2011.
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at Nagasaki in 1808.25 Indeed, every educated man in the Edo bakufu, as well as
in private domains, had firm knowledge about this foreign country and realized
its important role in world politics.
England’s victory over France in the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 had removed
the last serious rival on the world stage. The British Empire began to expand
exponentially after that, albeit in the form of territorial intrusion rather than in
the traditional form of colonial political control. Britain took possession of
Singapore, Malacca, and Burma. English activity created growing concern on
the part of the bakufu ’s officials when they received alarming information from
a Dutch representative in Nagasaki. In 1823, Takahashi Kageyasu,26 one of the
officials who collected information about the outside world for the leaders of the
bakufu, made some notable remarks about the expansion of the British colonies
and the strengthening of control over India. He noted that the British were
dealing with this land (i.e. Calcutta) as their own country, sending a senior
official, called a zeneraru (General, i.e. Governor-General), and keeping all the
ships belonging to the country under control.27 Takahashi understood the
importance of the growing British influence in India and the increasing political
dependence of India on Britain.
The British maneuvers made not only bakufu officials anxious, but also
many well-known intellectuals of the time. For example, Aizawa Seishisai28
wrote that England had annexed both ends of the African continent and was
expanding its position in India. In addition, he wrote that the British vessels
were using temporary stops in Far Eastern ports to draw maps, to measure the
ocean’s depth off Japan’s coasts, and to probe defenses.29 According to
Aizawa, Westerners had acquired many colonies located thousands of miles
25 In October 1808, an English frigate entered Nagasaki harbor to attack Dutch ships, capturing
Dutch representatives. The captain of the British frigate also demanded water and food. The
Nagasaki Magistrate immediately issued an order to Kyushu landlords to send additional
military forces to support the Nagasaki garrison, and provided supplies to the English ship in
order to gain more time. Meanwhile, the frigate left the harbor when the captain received
information that the Dutch ships wouldn’t visit Nagasaki that year. The Nagasaki Magistrate,
Matsudaira Yasuhide, took responsibility by committing suicide by seppuku, and news of his
death was widely circulated throughout the country.
26 Takahashi Kageyasu 高橋景保 (1785–1829), member of the Astronomy Bureau who became
famous because of his connection to Siebold and ultimately died in prison. His office was in
Edo, and this information circulated inside bakufu’s officials.
27 Katō 1985: 249.
28 Aizawa Seishisai 会沢正志斎 (1782–1863), a Japanese thinker of the Mito school during the
late Tokugawa period.
29 Wakabayashi 1986: 89.
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across the sea from their homelands, endeavoring to annex all nations in the
world.30
In 1825, the bakufu issued the Order to Repel Foreign Vessels, which
demanded that all foreign vessels be driven away from Japanese waters, repre-
senting a clear expression of seclusionism. This order was mainly directed
against small whaling ships but also against all coming “Southern
Barbarians”.31
Aizawa Seishisai was not the only intellectual who was interested in informa-
tion from abroad. Study of Western books and discussion of isolation policy were
the goals of many groups organized in the 1830s. Members of a society called
shoshikai, one of whom was Watanabe Kazan, started meeting in Edo in 1832, and
the number of members rose steadily from four or five to twenty-six. They met
occasionally and informally in order to exchange information about the West and
discuss foreign books.32 Watanabe Kazan wrote that England had great resources
and a naval power excelling that of other nations, and, for that reason, its foreign
policy actions had to be kept continually in clear focus.33 Nevertheless, he was
severely punished.
Takashima’s Memorandum also demonstrates that the critics of the Order to
Repel Foreign Vessels did not stop with the punishment of Watanabe Kazan:
Now, various southern barbarians, including the soldiers of the defeated troops, will attack
the vastness of the surrounding seas in war because they are more akin to thieves, who are
not afraid of death and will do things that can cause resentment. In our land, it is possible
that they can, through force, require supplies and water. It is not the case where we need
to become dirty through revenge using our military art. In addition, artillery has not yet
gained the necessary maturity, and therefore, in my opinion, this creates a situation where
we have no choice.34
5 The demonstration of European firearms
at Tokumarugahara
Under the strong influence of British victories in China, in his Memorandum,
Takashima Shūhan wrote:
30 Wakabayashi 1986: 90.
31 Wakabayashi 1986.
32 Abiko 1989: 200.
33 He was soon severely punished for having the courage to call for looking towards Britain
without fear or favor.
34 Takashima 1974: 7.
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England, compared with China, has a much smaller territory, and its military achievements
are not easily understood from the standpoint of ordinary common sense; the reasons for
their victory are not immediately clear. In spite of this, they came, and China suffered huge
defeats, while the British did not lose a single man. This is all, as I humbly think, thanks to
the standard weapons and their use.35
Firearms and linear tactics were the key elements used by the British army36 in
this period. This fact was clear for Takashima, who stressed:
Westerners and other barbarians use gunpowder weapons and warships as the primary
tools of warfare, employing gunnery as the foremost means of defending their country, and
they have actively mastered the techniques of their use. In recent years, weapons have
changed, and artillery technology has changed dramatically, having been tested in a series
of wars in real combat conditions.37
In his Memorandum, Takashima wrote that artillery is of paramount importance
for the defense of the country, and this statement can be seen as the core of his
thinking. Takashima received Dutch infantry reglament and, in Nagasaki, orga-
nized the training of samurai in the linear tactics of the European armies, with
the use of firearms and artillery. Various daimyō sent students to learn from
Takashima. It was the beginning of the Takashima-ryū, or the branch of martial
arts based on the study of Western military principles. Of course, it was not the
same education as in European military schools for soldiers that emphasized
line units’ maneuvers. In detail, Takashima investigated the Dutch infantry
reglament and, at Tokumarugahara, gave a demonstration not only of artillery
but also the line infantry regiments or new army tactics, which had comprised
the basis of European land armies from the middle of the 17th century to the
middle of the nineteenth century.38
35 Takashima 1974: 6.
36 Linear tactics dominated from the middle of the seventeenth century in infantry units with
an influx of hand guns. The Russian army also adopted linear tactics as part of their military
strategy. The relatively short shooting range of rifles and slow reload (two to three rounds per
minute) made massed formation firing essential for maximizing enemy casualties, so the
infantry was aligned into long thin lines and fired volleys. The line was considered as the
fundamental battle formation, as it allowed the largest deployment of firepower. A line con-
sisted of two, three, or four ranks of soldiers in order to give them time to reload arms.
Movement of the line was very slow, and if soldiers were not trained, breakdown of the
formation was almost inevitable. Line tactics required a strict discipline and long training of
simple movements.
37 Takashima 1974: 6.
38 The Russian army also adopted line infantry regiments as part of its military strategy from
the time of Peter I.
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In his Memorandum, Takashima made some proposals, based on his knowl-
edge of the European military, for the strengthening of the Japanese army. He
believed that England achieved many benefits because of its progress in artillery
and military tactics. Therefore, in his view, it was necessary to organize the
study of European artillery and tactics. In addition, he proposed the adoption of
mortars by the Japanese army so that they could be placed on the shore batteries
in Nagasaki and Edo bay.
The Memorandum that Takashima sent to the capital was transmitted to
another official, Torii Tadateru, who wrote a negative conclusion. The essence of
his objections was in accord with the position of the main contemporary
Japanese military schools that strongly stressed the core requirements of swords-
manship and personal courage. These sentiments were shared by many
Japanese people, and the debate about which was more important, samurai
courage or the quality of weaponry, continued until the Meiji Restoration.
Despite the critical evaluation of the Torii Tadateru, Takashima Shūhan decided
to move to Edo. In December 1840, he started his journey to the capital with a
small group of samurai from Nagasaki training under him. In addition, he had
several cannons and a number of rifles. Takashima arrived at the capital on
February 7 of the following year and was immediately ready to begin demon-
strations of advanced European military tactics and weapons; however, the
leaders of the bakufu delayed the demonstration for a few months.
The use of the Dutch infantry reglament formation and European weapons
was a very courageous step for the time, and many in the bakufu resisted the
innovations based on European methods. Mizuno Tadakuni39 gave his consent
only after a long period of consideration and waiting for the right opportunity.
Demonstration of European military tactics was then synchronized with the
Declaration of the Shogunal Will in May 1841. Although, in the words of the
Shogun, there was no direct mention of military reform, the declaration of
reform made by the Shogun had created a favorable environment for innovation,
which, in the recent past, could have been considered a punishable offense.
Only then was Takashima Shūhan permitted to demonstrate European tactics of
firearm use in the town of Tokumarugahara near Edo.
According to pictures drawn, in 1841, about one hundred men were engaged
at Tokumarugahara. Takashima had started selling weapons in Japan long
before the Opium War, so he easily managed to increase his infantry contingent
39 Mizuno Tadakuni 水野忠邦 (1794–1851) was, as rōjū shuza 老中首座 (Head of the Shogun
Council of Elders), a leading official in the bakufu in this period, also known for his Tenpo
Reforms.
The Memorandum of Takashima Shūhan 261
to 99 men and to borrow not only European rifles but also a cannon for the
demonstration.
The demonstration started with cannon shooting. A mortar and a howitzer
demonstrated the firing range of the foreign weapons. Then, the infantry pre-
sented linear tactics and line maneuvers, such as shooting from lines and
forming into a square. Under Takashima’s command, ninety-nine men were
equal to two platoons of a European army. So, Takashima, in a short time,
managed to prepare not only artillery but also infantry units that would have
been impossible without previous training. All of his soldiers were samurai from
different parts of Japan, with the most numerous group coming from Mito and
consisting of seven men.
In addition to line shooting, the Takashima unit also demonstrated a square
formation, which was one of the main infantry formations used in the case of
cavalry attacks. The square formation in Tokumarugahara had the form of a
triangle with cannons in the corners (because he only had three field guns: a
one, three, and four-pounder).
In armies of that time, the number of artillerists was fixed, even for the
infantry support guns: four artillerists for all types of cannons. Also, the number
of horses had to be fixed to two. The reports about Tokumarugahara did not
mention horses, so cannons were moved by artillerists, with four additional men
per cannon. Thus, we can conclude that the number of artillerists was 12 and
another 12 men helped to move the cannons.
Takashima also displayed new uniforms worn by the military students.
These articles of clothing did not resemble those in Europe, but they were also
completely different from the traditional armor (yoroi40) of the Japanese
samurai. The most conspicuous part was a peaked hat worn instead a traditional
helmet.
Despite the profound knowledge of the basic principles of line infantry
regiment tactics that he demonstrated at Tokumarugahara, in his
Memorandum, Takashima mainly stresses the merits of the artillery, which he
possibly considered the most important aspect for the modernization of the
Shogunal army. The merits of European artillery were clear from the experience
of war in China. Nevertheless, Takashima did not propose comprehensive reform
of the Shogunal army and made limited proposals, mainly concerning coastal
defense.
For a short time, Takashima Shūhan enjoyed the patronage of the top
leaders of the bakufu. He received gratitude from Mizuno Tadakuni and
40 鎧.
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consented to payments of 520 ryō41 for his artillery, which he had brought with
him. However, the bakufu was not ready to accept European weapons and
European military tactics, the main reason being that the finances of the govern-
ment were in extremely bad shape; once again, therefore, it was decided to shift
the burden of cost to the daimyō and concentrate on the building of coastal
batteries.
In July 1841, Egawa Hidetatsu42 was instructed to start construction in the
place called Nirayama, casting rifles on the European model based on the
technology proposed by Takashima. In September of the following year, the
major daimyō were allowed to produce cannons. However, shortly after that,
Takashima was placed under arrest.
From the time of the demonstration of European weapons at
Tokumarugahara, part of the administrative staff of the bakufu, and some
commanders of military units, expressed strong discontent and stood in opposi-
tion to Takashima’s activities. They emphasized that the actual results of the use
of European weapons were uncertain. Some of these critics had a rational base
for argument, since the target for mortar was set at 800 meters. The first
shooting range was about 300m, the second only at 100m, and the third
between 400 and 600m.43 The result was that the shooting was not stable and
the guns could not consistently hit their targets; they could only be used against
targets like enemy castles and camps. Ultimately, bakufu top officials came to
the conclusion that the radical innovations were undesirable. In his
Memorandum, Takashima wrote: “Even if I receive a reprimand, it will still be
happiness for me”,44 but it is a historical irony that his punishment was to be
much more severe than just a reprimand.
Takashima received a strong blow in the second half of 1842, when Torii
Tadateru presented a report accusing Takashima of plotting a conspiracy. In
October 1842, the authorities began to investigate these charges in connection
with Takashima Shūhan. In the end, criminal charges were not pressed, but
Takashima was accused of misappropriation of office funds in Nagasaki. All of
his property was confiscated, and, at the end of 1842, he was put in prison,
where he spent several years waiting for the end of the investigation. Later, he
was transferred to house arrest, only to be finally released in 1853. Ultimately, he
41 Gold or silver coins.
42 Egawa Hidetatsu 江川英龍 (1801–1855), daikan of the bakufu, well known for his interest in
Western knowledge.
43 Takashima 1974: 6.
44 Takashima 1974: 9.
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and his men from Nagasaki were replaced. They lost their positions, and control
over foreign trade was returned to the hands of the bakufu.
6 Problems of the bakufu
In 1842–1843, the bakufu placed a new order for four cannons and several
hundred rifles from a Dutch factory (more than was ordered while Takashima
was still in office). Mizuno Tadakuni ordered 50 rifles. Other members of the
Shogun Council of Elders, Hotta Masayoshi and Sanada Yukitsura, ordered 50
and 44 rifles, while the city administration of Nagasaki requested nearly one
hundred. Also, the Japanese authorities sent an enquiry about the cost of
building a steam ship with Dutch aid, or importing it from Holland.45 On
account of the execution of this order, three cannons and 255 rifles were
delivered the following year, and payment for this order, to the sum of 2265
ryō, was made in silver.46
In fact, the sum reminds us that the financial problems of the bakufu also
had to be kept in mind in the case of the introduction of firearms. The weight of
2265 ryō in silver is more than 600kg of chogin (or 72.48kg of high quality
silver,47 if we calculate one ryō equal to four silver ichibu). That is, payment
was made based in silver, which could easily be used to increase the volume of
trade, but it demanded huge amounts of precious metals that were being used to
pay for the budget deficit.
At a time of increasing activity of the bakufu leaders, it was not accidental
that, at the end of 1844, a letter was delivered from the King of the Netherlands,
Willem II, who wrote that isolation of the country – avoiding contact with other
powers – did not fit in with the new era, when the primary role would be played
by steamers. Willem believed that the steps taken in the decree of 1842 were not
sufficient and did not eliminate the risk of conflict with the great powers.
The tone of the Dutch King reveals that he understood that the recent steps
to ease the strict rules of the expulsion of foreign vessels, and the desire of the
bakufu to order items that represented the latest achievements in military and
other equipment, highlighted a significant shift in the policies of the Japanese
leaders. Nevertheless, the Japanese response was negative and did not raise the
possibility of expecting any further changes. Mizuno Tadakuni’s rival and
45 Satō 1980: 357.
46 Satō 1980: 357.
47 Author’s calculation.
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successor as Head of the Shogun Council of Elders, Abe Masahiro,48 sent a
negative response to a letter from the King of the Netherlands, making further
expansion of trade relations impossible. Under these circumstances, the expec-
tations of a breakthrough in foreign relations and the speedy modernization of
the army were out of the question. The remaining weapons, with a long delay in
delivery, came to Japan three years later in 1846.49 Despite the fact that
Takashima was put under arrest, military modernization was not completely
stopped nor prohibited. Rather, we should point out the slow speed of the
modernization of the Tokugawa army.
Further, the compulsory re-equipment of the bakufu army with modern
firearms required dozens of tons of silver, or many more resources than were
available to the bakufu at that time. The country was still affected by the
consequences of the Tenpo famine years (1833–1836), which greatly exacerbated
the financial difficulties of the bakufu and strongly influenced the Shogun
Council of Elders’ decisions concerning the purchase of additional weapons.
The budget deficit was permanent and was only covered by re-coinage. In
1820–1835, coin minting increased the budget by an additional 200,000–
250,000 ryō.50 In 1838 and 1841, the amount of income from re-coinage
amounted to more than a million ryō, which was almost half of the budget
revenues. In addition to the famine and various financial woes, there was also
the cost of the restoration of the Western part of the Edo castle and officially
sponsored events in connection with the transfer of the post of Shogun from
Ienari to Ieyoshi. Thus, from a purely financial point of view, the idea of
modernizing the military was out of the question. The bakufu had no money
for large purchases of weapons abroad or for a large-scale construction program
of coastal batteries. Thus, financial difficulties objectively prevented the rapid
and radical strengthening of defensive capabilities.
In addition, Japan lacked the technical resources and expertise for the
production of modern weapons. For some time, attempts to manufacture can-
nons inside the country had limited success due to technical problems in
casting. The main problem was obtaining high enough temperatures during
the smelting process. Without this, cannons were fragile, quickly breaking
down and needing constant repair. For artillery production, books were ordered
from Holland, but technological improvement was very slow. From 1843 to 1867,
three hundred and forty-six Western-style cannons were made, of which only
48 Abe Masahiro 阿部正弘 (1819–1857).
49 Satō 1980: 357.
50 Kitajima 1966: 232.
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eighty were cast from iron, the rest of which were bronze.51 Most of these were
not suitable for equipping coastal batteries because of their small caliber.
In 1842, the bakufu issued an order, which significantly changed the list of
measures that the Japanese authorities could use in case of entry of foreign
vessels in the country’s ports. A decree of 1825, which prescribed no hesitation in
repelling any foreign ship that appeared on the coast of Japan, was canceled.
Instead, it was ordered that the reasons why the ship had come to the coast of
Japan was to be heard. If it was due to compelling circumstances, then water,
provisions, and other necessary materials were to be provided, and then the ship
would be demanded to leave Japanese waters. In some ways, the Order of 1842
was a response to the current international situation.
In addition, we need to point to the connections between the ideas of
Takashima and the Order of 1842. Takashima never actually mentioned the
Order of 1825 as was one of the main tools of the sakoku regime, but rather
stressed the challenges of the situation under it. In the Memorandum,
Takashima does not propose radical changes of the existing policy, but mainly
stresses the need to strengthen the defense of several places for contact with the
foreign world, including Holland, China, and Korea. Even such modest propo-
sals were met with a stern reaction.
The Order of 1842 was issued as a response to external pressures. The
evidence strongly suggests that the response of the bakufu did not accurately
match the seriousness of problems that were challenging Japan at that time.
Clearly, it appears that the fear of losing the monopoly over foreign contacts was
one of the reasons for the weak response.
7 Conclusion
Japan’s ardent interest in European weapons had started long before the Opium
War. The first sample of rifles and cannons arrived in Japan in the 1830s. This
introduction to European military science consisted not only of a weapons cache
but also schematic descriptions of rifles and cannons to make soldiers battle
ready. In addition, Takashima Shūhan placed orders for books about European
technology and natural science, which he thought would be useful for the
reproduction of weapons in Japan, thus intending to overhaul the Japanese
military by means of a European template. In this sense, his overall goal was
to upgrade the production of weapons in Japan.
51 Yoshida 1985: 194.
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The reasons for Takashima’s fate were not only the result of the
Tokugawa period’s cultural ideology, but the limits of Japan’s technological
infrastructure and financial stability were also important factors necessary for
understanding why a comprehensive program of military modernization was
rejected. For the Tokugawa bakufu, despite the obvious advantages of a
modernized army, there were cultural, technical, and economic problems
that essentially prevented such reform from happening. It is important to
realize that, despite the fact that no real modernization of the military
occurred until the Meiji Restoration, the Takashima-ryū did influence the
military throughout the entire country. However, all of Takashima’s efforts
were ultimately narrowed down and channeled in the direction of teaching
mere firing and shooting techniques. It was only once Japan finally entered
into mainstream global modernization at the end of the Edo period that we
see an acceptance of Western military models and weapons production. The
efforts of Takashima Shūhan to increase Japan’s military prowess during a
time of British and European domination highlights the sharp contrast in
political and cultural views that existed at the time in pre-modern Japan.
The Tokugawa bakufu was not completely closed to the outside world. The
historical evidence indeed shows that it would be erroneous to think of
Tokugawa Japan in terms of complete isolation; however, it does appear that
the regime was highly authoritarian. In this context, we can better understand
that the aim of such a policy was not complete isolation, but rather part of an
attempt to monopolize and control contact with the outside world. Indeed, the
theme of control runs through much of the history during this feudal period,
suggesting a deep-rooted fear of exposing the daimyō and the daimyo system to
influences that might constitute a threat to its hold on power.
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